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Question
Abstract
This essay examines recent debate on the status of the author in contemporary literature by means of an
extended analysis of Samuel Beckett's Company. A number of critical responses to the Beckett text—
Wayne Booth's reading in The Rhetoric of Fiction is taken as symptomatic—are criticized for their
recuperation of the author-function in a text which moves beyond such well-wom routes of inquiry.
Company is read as an inevitably incomplete attempt to read "anachronistically," i.e. to expand (and
contract) story, discourse, and discursive positions starting from the necessary fiction of a present-tense
(from, to cite Gilles Deleuze, "il y a du langage"). It is concluded that, in any case, constructions of
"Beckett" by literary critics do not rid us of the implications of Beckettian discourse; instead, it is the
Beckettian discourse that will rid us of "Beckett."
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Partial Interpretations and Company.
Beckett, Foucault, et al. and the Author Question
Jim Hicks
University ofMassachusetts, Boston

Si ca continue c'est moi que je vais
perdre et les mile chemins qui y menent.
Et je ressemblerai a ces infortunes de fable,
dcrasds sous le poids de leur voeu exauce.

-Malone meurt
It may well be the case that any argument against philosophy faces
itself as first and most formidable opponent; that in short, by arguing
against philosophy, one does philosophy. Unless, that is, one decides to
critique philosophy by playing the piano, a decision, it would seem, with
obvious limitations. No doubt the opposite case, a critique of music by
philosophical argument, is also not without its problems. Nonetheless,
the career of at least one philosopher, that of Nietzsche, got its start by
doing precisely that. Moveover, if one accepts certain opinions of that
notorious author, at least one major composer of classical music, Richard
Wagner, found the most important source for his early music, not in
dialogue with the history of classical composition, but in response to
Schopenhauer's philosophy. While such examples do little to weaken the
argument alluded to above, and even less to excuse the various eccentricities in the prose of this essay, they may serve to illustrate the genealogical
complexity and heterogeneous constitution of both art and philosophy in
the present era, a period which is of course still marked by the monumental productions of, and the conflicts between, such figures as Nietzsche
and Wagner.
The analysis which follows, by offering an extended commentary on
a single literary text in order to demonstrate a philosophical point, will
not be, I hope, merely playing piano (although for some ears it might just
as well be). Given the issue addressed, i.e. the change in status of the
author in recent literary production, such a demonstration should imply
rather more than the interference or insouciance which might be banged
out on a keyboard. Instead, this essay will attempt to illustrate, by way
of example, certain consequences of that "murmur of indifference"
towards the author that Michel Foucault, in 1%9, called "one of the
fundamental ethical principles of contemporary writing (116)."
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As its introductory comments specify, Foucault's "What is an
Author?" essay is intended both as an attempt at self-criticism and a
response to criticism by others. Specifically, Foucault addresses the
accusation that, in The Order of Things, he played fast and loose in his
discussion ofcertain authors (Marx and Buffonare cited) and their works.
In answer to such criticisms, Foucault responds that the intentions of his
analysis have not been understood, that discursive formations (such as
"natural history" and "political economy") and not authors and their
works were his object of analysis in that book. However, in a clever
reversal, Foucault admits that, in the historical period which his work
discussed, the "question of the author" was in fact a means of ordering
discourse that he ought to have addressed; the essay that follows offers
that analysis. Thus, rather than admit that his analysis was indeed
disrespectful ofthe rights ofvarious founding fathers of modern thought,
Foucault chooses instead to elaborate the nature of the mores that demand
respect for such figures.
A recent essay on the author question by Alexander Nehamas, which
purports "to take some of [Foucault's] views but use them against him"
(33-34), offers this summary of the position of the French thinker:

Schematicallyand in abstract terms, [Foucault's] argument consists
of two stages. Beginning with the idea that the notion of the author
is an historical phenomenon and that the way of reading texts
associated with it has a definite temporal beginning, the first stage
concludes that this notion can come to an end. The second stage then
produces what it considers as good reasons for actually bringing this
possible end about. The argument finally concludes that both the
notion of the author and the treatment of texts it underwrites, that is
to say, literary interpretation, must come to an end. (3)

Nehamas' schemati7arion of the Foucauldian argument is striking both
for the narrative form in which it is given (complete with beginning,
middle and end), and for the linear simplicity of that narrative form. In
narratological terms, that which is offered here is the "story" (histoire);
as has already been suggested above, the narrative "discourse" (recit)
of Foucault's essay is rather more complex. Such a comparison is meant
to raise a few eyebrows; the story/discourse distinction, which is drawn
from the tradition of Russian Formalism and French Structuralism, is not
one with which, I assume, either Nehamas or Foucault would be entirely
comfortable.
Only after the introductory comments alluded to above, and after
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss2/9
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Foucault's essay begin its forward movement, borrowing direction from
a Beckett text. In the textual moment that follows, the "death or
disappearance of the author" (117) ("since Mallarme, an event of our
time" [120]) is assumed by Foucault as a fact of history whose
importance still is not fully appreciated (117). After a further discussion
of this present state of affairs, the essay finally begins to discuss the
historical aspects of the relationship between author and text. At least in
the discourse of this essay, it would seem as if the "empty space left by
the author's disappearance" (121) is the necessary discursive position
from which analysis of the author can begin. Thus, the "two-stage"
summary given by Nehamas actually reverses the argument as it is
represented in the opening of Foucault's essay. Rather than a political
assassination, the Foucauldian discourse suggests a memorial service:
because the author has disappeared, his story can and must be told.
As history suggests, the pomp and circumstances involved in a
particular rite of mourning are often excellent indications ofthe character
of the new sovereign. For the moment, however, I would like to
reconsider the "authorless" present state of affairs as it is evoked by
Foucault, and to offer a reading of that "murmur of indifference" to
which he alludes as well as illustrate that "lack of appreciation" still
present in most literary criticism. In order to do so, I will comment upon
a recent work by Samuel Beckett, discussing in particular its critical
reception, especially the reading of that text by Wayne Booth, a critic
whose views on the author question are quite close to those of Nehamas.'
In the "Afterword" to his most influential study (appended in 1983,
twenty-one years after the first edition), Booth offers an extensive
commentary on Beckett's Company (1980). This analysis serves, at least
in part, to demonstrate that the author of The Rhetoric ofFiction does in
fact appreciate a text that some might expect him to attack The first
question which his commentary poses is by no means unexpected; first
and foremost Booth wonders, "Who is speaking? "(445). In that same
year, elsewhere on the critical scene, lain Wright, like Booth, is occupied
with finding a speaker for Beckett texts, in an essay entitled " 'What
Matter Who's Speaking': Beckett, the Authorial Subject and Contemporary
Critical Theory."' In the particular case of Company, it is not always
merely an "implied author" that critics are after; Beckett's dauntless
biographer, like Booth, rushed in on the new ground, concluding that for
this work her subject ("Beckett") needed a "new directness" in telling
"the facts of his life one more time" (Bair 17). John Fletcher seems to
have even made the irreverent suggestion that Company is Beckett's
response to the (then recent) publication of his biography (1978), a
suggestion that, in the more pious opinion of Linda Ben-Zvi, would
Published by New Prairie Press
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diminish "the greatness of the work and the greatness of the author"
(Ben-Zvi 83).
This catalogue of critics is not meant to equate Booth's analysis of
Company with the other Beckett readings mentioned, merely to relate
them, in an order of increasing irrelevance. I shall argue that Booth's
reading fails, although it fails in a more interesting manner than most. The
reasons offered for that failure I borrow from Foucault, who may well
have been the best reader of Beckett to ever not write on the subject. In
short, the central concerns shared by the critics catalogued above are the
"tiresome repetitions" that he outlines at the end of the "Author" essay:
"Who is the real author?"; "Have we proof of his authenticity and
originality?"; and "What has he revealed of his most profound self?"
(138). Booth's commentary, although it addresses these questions, does
not offer much in the way of answers; nonetheless, if such efforts are
themselves misdirected, his lack of conclusions seems a good reason to
value the attempt.
Of course, essays on Beckett texts have also been written that do not
merely repeat those questions criticized by Foucault. However, it may
also be true that Beckett studies have more often attempted to demonstrate
the fruitlessness of author-centered inquiry than to inquire in other
directions. As for analyses of Company, at least two have been written,
by Eric Levy and by Livio Dobrez, that demonstrate admirably the
difficulty, and perhaps the impossibility, of "interpreting"this work in
any traditional sense of the term. Despite their merits, these two essays
ultimately tell us what Booth also shows, that which ought not to be done.
As Foucault insists, other questions remain unasked; questions to which,
it is my opinion, Company responds.
Before this essay proceeds in commenting on either Booth or
Beckett, it will be helpful to evoke in some detail the particular context
ofour analysis. The Grove Press edition of Company prints the following
summary on its back cover:
In Company, Samuel Beckett's most extended narrative since The
Lost Ones, a voice comes to "one on his back in the dark," and
speaks to him, or to some "other," describing significant moments
in a life: a child asking his mother if the sky is not farther away than
it seems, a man avoiding the thought of his lover being pregnant, a
child being born the day Christ died. And yet, we are told it is all a
fable, these memories, or figments of the imagination of oneperhaps himself-devised or imagined, for the sake of company.
The voice announces that words, and "the fable of one fabling of one
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss2/9
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with you in the dark" are coming to an end, and that the being lying
on his back is, as he always was, alone.

In this summary a certain bias is apparent, one that is also shared by the
critics catalogued above. Given the three primary subjective positions of
the text, which Booth describeswe have one in the dark, listening, then the "voice" addressing him
in second person; and the voice of a third, perhaps in another dark,
devising it all, cankerously, for company. (447)

-the summary that markets Company, like the criticism that interprets
it, tends to privilege two positions, that of the hearer and that ofthe second
person voice, to the near exclusion of the third, the "other," whose third
person discourse (not "voice") in fact dominates the text (in number of
paragraphs, by more than two to one; in pages, by roughly that). The
temptation to privilege the second person voice, and the "significant
moments" that it records, is perhaps understandable; these passages do
appear to demonstrate, as Booth suggests, that "beauty is, after all, in
[Beckett's] line" (453). Like others, I cannot resist the simple homage
of citation:

The light there was then. On your back in the dark the light there was
then. Sunless cloudless brightness. . Straining out from your nest
in the gorse with your eyes across the water till they ache. You close
them while you count a hundred. Then open and strain again. Again
and again. Till in the end it is there. Palest blue against the pale sky.
You lie in the dark and are back in that light. (25)
. .

Such revery is no doubt seductive. Nonetheless, it is difficult to
understand how the very critics who center their effort on postulating an
author manage to be so easily seduced into turning away from the
"authorial" third position, that of "another devising it all for
company" (8). Here again Booth is exemplary, he notes, "If we rule out
the pages about the problems of telling, of imagining, of remembering
the story, we have a lifetime in about twenty short pages" (450). Whether
or not Company belongs in the fictional tradition that Booth characterizes
as "almost frantic imitation of Tristram Shandyism" (451), it should be
clear that, if one is attempting to comment on the "author-function" of
this text, a tendency to rule out the pages of a text that themselves address
that function is not a tendency to be encouraged.
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After having reconstructed Company as the " story of a complete, or
nearly complete, life and of its fragmentary telling, reduced . . . to a bare
outline of its materials," Booth speculates that these materials "could
have been made into any number of fully realized plots with radically
different effects" (448). He then illustrates this comment by showing
how, through capitalizing on different parts of that base material, the text
might have been realized as a "bitter but funny farce," as a "long
biographical novel," or as a "lament about the meaninglessness of the
world" (448-49). Since Booth has chosen this text with appreciation in
mind, one is not entirely surprised when such speculations end by
concluding that Beckett's "finished tale is designed to give the reader the
greatest possible pleasure" (450). However, if in that text as Booth
argues, "every stroke is in a direction different from what would be
dictated by-or at least effective in-realizing the other inherently
possible plots" (450), one might wonderjust what is so pleasurable about
this accumulation of frustrated potential. Here Booth's explanations lead
him against the grain of his intended "appreciation" and, in order to
resolve the conflict, he falls back on an impressionistic evocation of
"mysterious catharsis" and "detennination"somehow analogous to
"moral choice" (450). In earlier analyses within The Rhetoric ofFiction,
similar explanations led to radically dissimilar conclusions.
Over and above the complexities of Booth's appreciation ofBeckett,
his reading of Company is finally, I believe, merely a whitewashed
version of his earlier reading of Celine' s Journey to the End ofthe Night.'
In both cases, the bottom line in Booth's reading is its author's resistance
to reading. Faced with Celine, that resistance is shown in its most
characteristic mode; it surfaces most abruptly in a sentence that interrupts
Booth's "sympathetic" portrayal of the perspective shared by Bardamu
and Celine. Such sympathy can only go so far, he argues, "And then we
draw back" (383, my emphasis). Here Booth's reaction (which is not
ours) and the subsequent reversal in rhetoric are elicited by revulsion (in
both an early, seventeenth-century sense of the word, "the action of
drawing, or the fact ofbeing drawn, back or away" [Compact OED 2533]
and in the modem sense as well). Such a reaction is, in my opinion, a
profoundly political gesture; Booth would probably say that it is moral.
Although more covert, an analogous move is involved in Booth's
reading of Company. Even more than the analytic techniques described
above (both the privileging of "significant moments" at the expense of
the author-function and the extended description of how textual material
is not used by the text, either of which could be argued to manifest
resistance), the concluding paragraphs of Booth's reading display his
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss2/9
fundamental antipathy toward that sort of writing that he refers to as
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"lament[s] for the human condition" (456). In Booth's opinion, which
he has managed to defer until these concluding remarks, such a "genre
or mode" is:
an extremely limited kind, limited because
it is ethically,
politically, and metaphysically maimed and perhaps even capable,
with many readers, of maiming. (456)
.

.

.

The reading ends with an acknowledgement of the test that a "work as
good as this" puts to its critics, concluding with a striking last sentence.
With his last words on the subject, the author recognizes that,
Even when I move to the proud moment of resistance, I know that
I am wrestling with a powerful angel indeed. (456-57)
Such moments of self-reflection make it evident that, even if Booth fails,
it is at a higher level than that on which most critics succeed.
Nonetheless, it remains my opinion that Booth meant demon where
he wrote angel, and that, at least in criticism, there probably isn't much
difference between the two. That which I should like to reiterate here is
the manner in which Booth's wrestling first leads him to discount the
importance of major portions of the text, then to propose alternative
modes of narrativizing "avoided" by the text, finally leading him to
sermonize against the dangers of a "genre or mode" probably invented
by Booth in order to give him something besides Beckett to attack. All
this, strangely enough, is done in the name of "appreciation." Booth's
problems with this text, I would argue, result from his attempts to
rationalize his a priori endorsement of a text that counters the authorcentered foundation of his appreciative enterprise.
Nonetheless, I do not wish to suggest that Booth is simply wrong,
either to wrestle or to narrativize; hence my own characterization of the
Beckett text (itself suggestive of certain narrative possibilities) as
capable of countering, and by extension of endorsing, certain interpretive
practices. To my knowledge, there are at least two distinct ways to
respond to a narrative which effectively deflate its representational
claims without contesting the veracity of those claims. The first is to rerepresent that narrative as a minor part of another, more compelling
narrative. The second method is to respond, " So what?" (a response that
William Labov argues narratives constantly work to fend off). The
discourse of Foucault's "Author" essay, by suggesting that historical
study of the author can be initiated only after the appearance of
"authorless" writing, illustrates that the former method, the attempt at
Published by New Prairie Press
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subsuming one narrative under another, may in some cases be grounded
in the values that give rise to the latter.
Beckett, it seems to me, responds in just this manner to a Boothian
concern with the author. Beginning and ending in that ethic of indifference
to which Foucault alludes, Company takes the "self-constructing"
enterprise of Booth et al. under its wing (primarily through the assertions
of the second person voice) only to displace or dismantle such concerns
through the investigation of its own discursive situation. As such, it is not
surprising that Booth and others tend to "rule out" the third person
discourse in the text; it is precisely that discourse that subordinates their
own practice under another which, almost by definition, they ignore. The
least that may be said is that this "other" practice is beyond the scope
of their interests. In order to elaborate the means by which Company
manages to subsume interest in the author into its own larger enterprise,
it will be necessary to look more closely at certain characteristics of the
text.
Excepting the mixed introductory paragraphs, and perhaps a few
final pages as well, the largest part of Company proceeds by an uneven
alternation between anecdotal paragraphs (from the voice, fifteen in all)
and analytic paragraphs (from the other, thirty-seven in all). As Ben-Zvi
has shown, the anecdotes told by the voice can be divided into groups
according to the age of their protagonist; they represent the history of
either a child, an adult, or an old man. Those that tell of a child
predominate early in the text, those of an old man dominate in the end:
Youth

12

4 5 6

89

Adult

11 12

Old Age

3

7

10

13 14 15

(Ben-Zvi 77)

The third-person, analytic passages also have a "developmental"
tendency, although in a different sense of the word. Although its
intertextual structuring is more complex, the discursive mode of the other
also develops, or at least accumulates, direction. These "other" passages
analyze the following:
The Hearer / The Voice / The Other / Another Still
1

1

2
2 (multiple objects multiply marked)
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss2/9
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3

4
5

6
7
8

7
9

10
11
12
13
14

14
15
16
17

15

18
19

20
21

21

22
23

24
25

25

25
26
27

28
29
30
31

32
33

35
36

33

34
35
37

The primary tendency demonstrated is clear: early in the text, analysis
is most occupied with the hearer, toward the end, it is instead most often
directed at the other himself. This tendency is also correlated with an
development in subject matter: as the object intended increasingly
becomes the other himself, that otherbecomesprogressively less adequate
to his function of "deviser." The point is that, while in both its anecdotes
Published by New Prairie Press
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and in analysis, Company does develop a certain directional bias, the
critics, by privileging these textual tendencies to the exclusion of all
others, construct a story that moves in only that direction. On one hand,
in the second person anecdotes, we get the objectification (and
correspondinginteriorization) of solitude: the voice first tells of childish
failures in the search for "company," it then presents adults and old men
seemingly incapable affecting their surroundings at all. Alternately, in
the situational analysis of the third person discourse, we get commentary
which, because of its "reason-ridden" imagination (cf. 33, 53), tends
increasingly to objectify the failed and failing labor of its own generation,
finally reaching a point where both the "deviser" and the "hearer" are
portrayed as equally pathetic, helpless bodies (the first prone and
immobile, the other nude, supine, and seemingly manacled [56-57]). If
this were the whole matter, if the story moved only in this direction,
Beckett's text would clearly be the latter-day equivalent of a sentimental
novel, full of the paternal, patronizing identification with the accursed
share of a pathetic object.
In fact, another aspect of Company pointed out by Ben-Zvi serves
to counter such critical tendencies, i.e., the textual thematization of
movement "withershins" (78).4 The pervasive resonance of this word in
the text (think of the immobile figure on the strand [54], staring at the
shadow of his staff in the dying light) marks, in a rather primordial
fashion, a violation of "natural motion" which disrupts that hardening
and simplifying of narrative direction that is elaborated above.
Ben-Zvi equates this theme with a (naive) attempt at liberation, and
she emphasizes the inevitability of its defeat. Propounding the inevitability
of natural motion, she comments:
Beckett assigns all his characters the same direction, from east to
west, indicating their common journey from birth to death. This
movement is also indicated in the novel by shifts from light to dark.
The boy (of the first anecdote), like the figures who follow him, starts
out in the light of early morning and heads into darkness. It is the
same, inevitable darkness of night and age experienced by the man
in the dark who imagines these scenes of the past. Against the pull
of the inevitable direction of motion, there is the attempted rebellion.
In one memory, after following the familiar direction, "suddenly
you cut through the hedge and vanish hobbling east across the
gallops" (24). . . . In old age the figure, no longer able to go out and
traverse the countryside, sits staring at the inevitable rounds of the
hands of the clock. "Withershins" is now impossible. (78)
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss2/9
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This is clearly persuasive commentary, and again, one would not want
to say that it is wrong, at least in any simple fashion. Nonetheless I cannot
be satisfied, as this commentator apparently is, with a "lament for the
human condition."
Both Booth and Ben-Zvi single out for comment that anecdote which
describes at length an old man whose eyes light on the face of a watch,
and who begins to analyze the variation in distance between the second
hand and its shadow during a single revolution of that hand (57-59). In
fact, Booth comments upon the passage twice; first to characterize it as
boring, as "the one fault
that I find in the book" (451). Later, with
a rare blunder, Booth confuses the deviser, said to be lying prone by this
time (56), with the supine hearer, who has been portrayed as nude, with
his feet splayed and his hands "invisibly manacled" in the preceding
paragraph (56-57). Booth then assumes that this composite figure
invented by his reading is also the same as that in the old man and the
watch anecdote that quickly follows, and, for a moment, imagines that
this might be the narrator that he has long awaited, the one "who
understands and controls all this" (454). The section of Company that
follows, which posits again the possibility of "another still," dashes the
hopes of Booth's homogenizing reader, who must then conclude that he
has let himself be "tricked again" (454).
In fact, Booth's disappointment is once again symptomatic; this
passage from Company demonstrates both the analytic will-to-structure
and the forces that counter that will. If one were inclined to allegorize,
as it appears we are, what could be a more apt parody of the failed search
for origins than the observation ofthat second hand stubbornly preceding
its shadow, or, for that matter, a better parody of imminent death than a
second hand whose shadow lies just ahead? And, of course, with a little
reflection (or with a change in the direction of the light source), these
relationships can be reversed: one might also contemplate the trotteuse
that chases its mythic origin, or else tries to escape the inevitability of
closure. In any case, the search here, and the search of representation in
general, is for the particular constants that may be revealed in any
situation. Here as elsewhere there are constants to be found; their number,
like the attention of the old man, is limited only by exhaustion or disgust.
As a "constant," an infinitesimally slight halt in the course of
natural motion, the shadow's disappearance might not even be recognized
as the ground of withershins. Although infinitely brief, this sort of
disappearance is perhaps also infinitely expandable. Indeed, such extension
may be an emblem for the "whole" of Company, such as it is. ("A voice
comes to one on his back in the dark. Imagine.") Even the final paragraph
of the text, which is not its last word, expands such a moment.
Published by New Prairie Press
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In this closing paragraph, which utilizes second person discourse,
that which is staged is that "unexpected grace" with which its subject
assumes the position of object. In a gesture said to be repeated until the
impulse toward its "converse operation" is exhausted, the subject,
sitting huddled, arms around the legs, suddenly releases that hold and lies,
assuming a supine position. This shift, which takes its mobility from the
"deviser" and brings that function into the abject position of the
"hearer, " might easily be read to unify those very textual concerns which
had just been most fully isolated or "objectified." However, it is the
disruptive force ofthis moment which is given most emphasis by the text.
Like the "deviser," who, it is said, "could not conceivably create while
crawling" (53), the subject of this paragraph, the "one fabling," must
"cut short" his fable during both the "act of lying" and its "converse
operation" (62). Mimicking the collapse of this other, the narrative itself
(its yield said to be only "labour lost and silence") is cut short on the
following page (63).
It seems safe to suggest that, for a text that fails to construct a
protagonist, and which sacrifices its "fabler" in order "to make an end
at any price" (60), the interpretive construction of an "author-figure"
seems ill-advised. However, an enterprising literary critic, in an attempt
to capitalize on this failure (this is the position of Iain Wright), might yet
claim that the text's author is in fact that very figure responsible for
advancing failure as the only true result of fabling. Although I have no
real defense against such claims, defending against them is perhaps
unnecessary, given the fact that they appear to defeat themselves.
Literary interpretations, as readings, are also arguments for reading, and
I cannot conceive of an instance in which criticism might produce such
a "failed" author, except (as in the case of Booth or Wright) in order to
dispose of hint And if Foucault is right-as I think he is-about the
contemporary ethic of authorial indifference, getting rid of "Beckett"is
not going to rid us of Beckettian discourse. Rather, it is Beckettian
discourse that will rid us of "Beckett."
In his description of the interpretive process, Nehamas claims that,
although the author is a construct, and thus a product of interpretation,
the construction of this author-figure is not, in any useful sense of the
term, "arbitrary." This style of argumentation seems to have been
borrowed from Stanley Fish, a critic who has long labored to make
conservatism appear scandalous. By first distinguishing his "authorfigure" from the historical "writer," Nehamas evokes a phantom of the
arbitrary which, in philosophy, goes back at least to Locke's blank slate
and Descartes' cogito. However, within a very few lines, Nehamas
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol17/iss2/9
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pledges his allegiance to tradition as well, or at least to the administrative
force of tradition. He argues:

In general, the author is to be construed as a plausible historical
variant of the writer, as a character the writer could have been.
To show that a well-established practice is arbitrary entails
showing that at least one alternative practice, truly distinct from it,
actually exists and makes a claim to being followed. . . Only a
consistent effort to read an entire text in a thoroughly anachronistic
manner, an effort which would involve nothing less than reading the
entire history of the literary tradition in this manner, would show that
the figure of the author is arbitrary in an important or harmful
sense.(27-28)
.

.

.

.

In the Beckett text discussed above, it is of course the third person
discourse that analyzes the actuality of that text's discursive situation. In
so doing, Beckett manages to turn Benveniste, and his crucial distinction
between discours and histoire, upside down. For Benveniste, it is the
subjective, I-dominated transactions of first and second person discourse
(based in the grammatical "now" of linguistic instantiation) that tend to
foster the extrapolation of "personality" over objective, historical time.
For Company, it is the reverse: the objective facticity of the present is the
a priori which precedes any attempt (including failed attempts) at a
subjective construction of the past. Given the fact that the Beckett text
explicitly presents itself as extrapolating from the present, I wonder if
Nehamas would consider this particular, albeit literary, text as "a
consistent effort to read . . . in a thoroughly anachronistic manner" (28).
Whether Nehamas agrees about the Beckett text or not, it is clear that
Foucault's "Author" essay is just such an effort. As mentioned above,
that essay pretends to justify and to supplement the critical practice that
Foucault employed during his earlier analysis of seventeenth-and
eighteenth-centuryEurope. Thus, the "Author" essay offers a revaluation
of the disappearance of the author from The Order of Things, suggesting
that its "authorless" interpretive practice was in fact only an effect of its
contemporary perspective. Rather than argue that, in historical analysis,
such effects should be minimalized, and that a more "objective"
analysis should be attempted, the discourse of Foucault suggests that
these anachronisms remain problematic only because they are at present
insufficiently disseminated in the contemporary critical practice. The
Foucauldian oeuvre marks an impressive attempt, although necessarily
incomplete, to remedy that situation.
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Like the Beckett text, the discourse of Foucault suggests that the
"objectivity" of an expandable present (or, as Deleuze puts it, the "ily
a du langage") is the true place from which to start, although even this
objectivity is itself a discursive fiction, it is in fact no place at all. In a
lecture, Nehamas has commented that, ultimately, any effort of literary
interpretation implies a complete history of the literary tradition, if not
a history of the entire world. If such is indeed the case, it is certainly not
only the authorless, anachronistic few that, in their attempts at revision,
are destined to "partial interpretations of parts of texts" (28). Nor will
it be only graduate students that are plagued with "incompletes."

Notes
discussion of both the similarities and differences between Booth's
"implied author" and Nehamas' "postulated author" is contained in the
1. A

article by Nehamas cited above (10-11).
2. This essay, which owes more to Booth than to Foucault, concludes that
the implied author of Beckett's trilogy stands for those ideas frequently
referred to as "post-structuralist. " The post-structuralists, it will be recalled,
purport to have no ideas.

reading which Booth's "Afterword" is explicitly designed to
supplement.
3. A

4. Ben-Zvi defines the word as meaning "movement in a counterclockwise
direction." For this word (of Scottish origin), the Compact OED gives two
definitions, both dating from the sixteenth century: "1) In a direction
opposite to the usual, the wrong way; to stand or start withershins, (of the
hair) to 'stand on end'. Obs.; 2) In a direction contrary to the apparent course
of the sun (considered as unlucky or causing disaster)" (3801). On the two
occasions in which the word appears (38; 50), Beckett's French text gives
first "dans le non -sees des aiguilles" then "senestrorsum"; also, on both
occasions, in both versions, usage of the word or phrase is contiguous with
a "heart too heavy" (38).
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